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— Note —
The Third Amendment
Incorporated: “Soldiers” and
Domestic Law Enforcement
“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.” 1
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Introduction
In 2013, the Mitchell family sued the City of Henderson for violating their Third Amendment rights. 2 According to the complaint, several police officers forcibly removed Anthony Mitchell and his parents,
Linda and Michael, from their respective homes 3 and remained in them
for several hours. 4 The police initially asked for the family’s cooperation
in investigating a domestic violence dispute involving one of their nextdoor neighbors. 5 Evidently, the nature of the dispute required SWAT
team assistance. 6
When Anthony declined to assist the police, he was forcibly removed from his home and arrested. 7 The officers remained in his home
to carry out their surveillance on Anthony’s neighbor as planned. 8 After
a bizarre turn of events, the officers subsequently arrested Michael and
forcibly removed Linda from their home, presumably also for
surveillance. 9 The officers searched the family house and the cars,
spilled condiments from the refrigerator onto the floor, and drank from
the Mitchells’ cooler, evidenced by fifteen empty plastic cups found in
the trashcan. 10 The Mitchell family sued, claiming the officers
“quartered themselves in [their home] without their consent, violating
their rights guaranteed by the Third and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.” 11 While the district court allowed some
of the family’s other claims to proceed on the merits, the court
dismissed the family’s Third Amendment claim, holding that municipal
police officers are not “soldiers” within the meaning of the Third
Amendment. 12

2.

First Amended Complaint at 29, Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13cv-01154, (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015).

3.

Anthony Mitchell and his parents own separate homes on the same street.
Id. at 6.

4.

Id. at 36.

5.

Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154, 2015 WL 427835, at *1
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015).

6.

Id.

7.

Id. at *2–4.

8.

Id. at *3.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 29.

12.

Mitchell, 2015 WL 427835, at *18.
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Of all the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights, the Third
Amendment is the least litigated. 13 The contours of Third Amendment’s
protections are undefined and untested. The first, and only, Third
Amendment case to be tried on the merits was in 1981. 14 Since then,
only a handful of courts have even considered Third Amendment claims
before dismissing the challenges. Significantly, because the Amendment
has never been the subject of a U.S. Supreme Court challenge, it has
not been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 15
Unfortunately, the case law, as well as most academic literature on
the Third Amendment, is without a comprehensive incorporation
analysis. As the recent Second Amendment jurisprudence suggests, this
is a missed opportunity. That is, District of Columbia v. Heller 16 and
McDonald v. City of Chicago 17 illustrate how the incorporation question
involves an analytical framework quite distinct from the framework
required to ascertain original meaning. These cases also show how the
Supreme Court reinterpreted the Second Amendment, finding that the
Amendment’s original militia-focused purpose was no longer a
limitation to the Amendment’s reach.
If the Supreme Court ever considers whether the Third Amendment
binds state and local law enforcement, the Court would likely model
the analysis on Heller and McDonald. For protections yet to be
authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, like the Third
Amendment, the Court will have to undergo two layers of analysis—
one to determine original meaning, the other to determine whether the
right applies against state and local governments.
First we ask what a constitutional amendment means based on the
text, original understanding, and legislative history leading up to
ratification in 1789. In this Note, step one will be analyzed through an
originalist lens, 18 given that method of interpretation’s general acceptance by today’s Court. 19 Thus, we ask how the Framers’ generation
13.

Tom W. Bell, Note, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2
Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 117, 140 (1993).

14.

Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

15.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010); but see Engblom
v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming the district court’s
holding that the Third Amendment applies against state governments).

16.

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

17.

561 U.S. 742 (2010).

18.

In this Note, I do not intend to consider the various strands of originalism.
Rather, I analyze the Third Amendment’s meaning, as of 1789, using the
originalist model Justice Scalia employed in District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).

19.

See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Geo. L.J. 657, 659 (2009)
(noting that in Heller, “[n]ot only did Justice Scalia secure five votes for
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“would have expected the relevant constitutional principles to be articulated and applied,” 20 eschewing any consideration of “current
societal values” in favor of an original, “fixed meaning.” 21
Given the interpretation in step one, step two determines whether
the right applies to state and local governments—that is, whether the
right is “fundamental” and thus applies against the states, through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Here, the step two
analysis is even more malleable than that of step one, and hence, lends
itself to alternative interpretations. This is because the analysis calls
for two lines of inquiry which can, in theory, lead to different outcomes.
On the one hand, we widen the inquiry by asking whether the right is
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 22 Here, the Court
looks to the depths of American history, as well of English common-law
history, up until 1868, the year the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. At the same time, we are asking a more specific question—
whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended for the
right in question to be incorporated against the states. As will be
demonstrated, this inquiry—versus the originalist inquiry tethered to
the time of the Bill of Rights’s ratification (step one)—can alter the
application, and even the character, of a Bill of Rights protection.
This observation bodes well for the question of the Third Amendment’s present-day reach. As will be discussed in this Note, an originalist analysis of the term “soldier,” as used in the Third Amendment,
is unlikely to be interpreted by a court as applying, or being intended
to apply, to municipal police. That is, “soldier” was most certainly
understood by the Framers of the Constitution as applying to a narrow
class of federal governmental actors. 23 Incorporation doctrine, however,
allows for a second round of analysis in deriving meaning from a Bill of
Rights guarantee, which takes into account American attitudes and
understandings during the eighteenth century.
In this Note I argue that future Third Amendment litigants should
utilize incorporation analysis to tie “soldiers” to municipal police. That
is, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, given certain historical
developments during the nineteenth century, would have understood
the most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the Court’s history, but
Justice Stevens’s dissent appeared to engage rather than challenge the
majority’s originalist premises”).
20.

See Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism 7 (2011) (referring to Scalia’s
method of originalist interpretation as an “original expected application,”
which “asks how people living at the time the text was adopted would have
expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense”).

21.

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 854
(1989).

22.

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 721 (1997)).

23.

See infra Part III.C.
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“soldier” as encompassing local, modern-day state actors including
police officers and certainly police paramilitary units like SWAT. I
arrive at this conclusion by considering what governmental actors were
considered “soldiers” at the time of the Constitution’s ratification, and
then considering what functions those “soldiers” served during the
course of the nineteenth century until Reconstruction. I then analyze
the status of local law enforcement in the mid-nineteenth century and
how it compares to local law enforcement today. The answers to these
questions suggest that an incorporated Third Amendment ought to
bind state and municipal law enforcement.
Part I of this Note will discuss what we know about the Third
Amendment today, given the sparse case law and scholarly commentary. Part II will illustrate the mechanics required to interpret a Bill of
Rights protection and the differences inherent in incorporation analysis.
As a guide, I will look to the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the Second Amendment. Part III will analyze what the Third
Amendment means based on the Framers’ intent. In Part IV, I will
consider the Third Amendment through incorporation analysis. I
conclude that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would have
contemplated today’s police to fall within the Third Amendment’s
grasp. Finally, I end by commenting on implications inherent in
applying the Third Amendment to state and local law enforcement.

I. What We Know About the Third Amendment
The Third Amendment is the least litigated of the Bill of Rights
Amendments. 24 Most of the Third Amendment’s treatment by federal
courts has consisted of symbolic interpretations contained in dicta.
Similarly, the legal scholarship exploring the Third Amendment is
wanting. As I argue in this Note, the dearth of scholarly attention paid
to the relationship between incorporation and the Third Amendment
represents a significant oversight.
A. The Courts

The little attention the Third Amendment has received by the judiciary reveals two distinct treatments of the right. On the one hand,
some courts have briefly considered specific Third Amendment claims
before promptly dismissing them, with only one notable exception. 25 On
the other hand, courts have invoked the Third Amendment as support
for the proposition that the concepts of property and privacy interests
are embedded in the Constitution.

24.

Bell, supra note 13, at 140.

25.

See infra Part I.A.1.
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The latter approach—the symbolic application—has been invoked
sua sponte by the U.S. Supreme Court on a few limited occasions. For
example, in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute involving civilian
parties, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked the Third Amendment in
1921. 26 The Court noted that the Third Amendment was added to the
Constitution “in recognition of the purpose to protect property and the
rights of its owner from governmental aggression.” 27
Forty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court twice invoked the Third
Amendment, in the context of contraception, as a symbol of the
Founding Fathers’ commitment to privacy. In Poe v. Ullman, 28 for
example, Justice Harlan dissented, interpreting the Third Amendment,
in light of the Fourth Amendment, as embracing “the concept of the
privacy of the home.” 29 Subsequently, Justice Douglas reiterated the
Court’s position in Griswold v. Connecticut 30 where he said that the
Third, along with the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, created
a “zone of privacy.” 31 Some recent courts have echoed this sentiment.32
Conversely, courts that have considered literal Third Amendment
claims have interpreted the Amendment narrowly. In Custer County
Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 33 for example, the Tenth Circuit declined to
apply the Third Amendment’s protections to Colorado homeowners
seeking to have the airspace above their homes free from military
aircraft travel. 34 Similarly, in Jones v. U.S. Secretary of Defense, 35 a
federal court denied the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin, on Third Amendment grounds, commanders of the United States Army from requiring
army reservists to participate in a military parade. 36 The first case to

26.

Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

27.

Id. at 165.

28.

367 U.S. 497 (1961).

29.

Id. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

30.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

31.

Id. at 484.

32.

See, e.g., United States v. Warras, No. 2:13-cr-439-LDG-VCF, 2015 WL
6736981, at *6 (D. Nev. May 18, 2015) (noting that the Third, like the First
and Fifth Amendments, protects the home, which “occupies a special place
in the pantheon of constitutional rights” (quoting United States v.
Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2008))).

33.

256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001).

34.

Id. at 1043.

35.

346 F. Supp. 97, 98–100 (D. Minn. 1972).

36.

Id. at 98–100.
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begin to identify the Third Amendment’s contours was Engblom v.
Carey in 1981. 37
1. Engblom v. Carey

The Engblom plaintiffs were corrections officers at a prison in New
York. 38 The plaintiffs rented, and used as their residences, on-site
dormitory-style housing, made available by the prison for a monthly
rate. 39 One morning in 1979, most of the corrections officers at the
prison skipped work in favor of partaking in a statewide union strike.40
In response, the Governor called forth the New York National Guard
to assist with peacekeeping at the prison. 41 Over 200 National Guardsman, with permission of the prison superintendent, occupied the
plaintiff’s dormitories at the prison, staying there for ten days. 42
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ section 1983 claim on the
grounds that they lacked sufficient possessory interests in the dormitories to render them a “house” within the meaning of the Third
Amendment. 43 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the court, without
getting into much detail, 44 found that the Third Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause. 45 Further, the court held that National Guardsmen
are “soldiers” within the meaning of the Third Amendment. 46 The court
reasoned that the National Guardsmen are the modern-day successors
to the Militias reserved to the states through the Constitution, 47 and
37.

See Engblom v. Carey, 522 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“From the time
of [the Third Amendment’s] adoption until September 10, 1979, the date of
the filing of this action, as far as can be determined, no citizen has found it
necessary to invoke the Amendment to protect his dwelling from use by the
military. In an extraordinary demonstration of the vitality and versatility of
our Constitution, just such a claim is here made for the first time, albeit
unsuccessfully.”).

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 62.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 63.

43.

Id. at 67–68.

44.

Id. at 65 (stating that “[h]ere it should not be necessary to wander too far
into the thicket of incorporation jurisprudence”).

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 15, 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions; To Provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
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that National Guardsmen are employees of the state under control of
the Governor, except when federalized by unit. 48
On appeal, the Second Circuit remanded the case for trial on the
Third Amendment claim. 49 The court agreed with the district court
that the Third Amendment is incorporated against the states. 50 Second,
the court confirmed that National Guardsman are “soldiers” within the
meaning of the Amendment and are state employees under the
Governor’s direction. 51 Third, the court reaffirmed that the Third
Amendment was “designed to assure a fundamental right to privacy.”52
In terms of the word “house,” the court rejected the “formalistic
construction” employed by the district court. 53 The court found that
“house” is not limited to residences “arising out of fee simple ownership
but extend to those recognized and permitted by society as founded on
lawful occupation or possession with a legal right to exclude others.” 54
In short, by allowing the claim to proceed, the Second Circuit recognized a contemporary application of the Third Amendment that,
arguably, expanded the Amendment’s scope. Nonetheless, on remand
the district court declined to hold the defendants liable for Third
Amendment violations because, being state actors, they were protected
by qualified immunity. 55 Because the Third Amendment rights were not
“clearly established” at the time of the encroachment, the government
was shielded from liability. 56
2. Estate of Bennett and Mitchell

Finally, there have been two federal cases within the last ten years
in which litigants sought application of the Third Amendment to

employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”).
48.

Engblom, 522 F. Supp. at 65.

49.

Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 966 (2d Cir. 1982).

50.

Id. at 961.

51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 962.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).

56.

Id. at 46 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We
therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions,
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” (emphasis added))).
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municipal law enforcement. In Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 57 the
dismissal was a foregone conclusion given what the judge described as
“less than illuminating” allegations in the complaint. 58 Nonetheless,
regarding the plaintiff’s attempt to link the Third Amendment to
municipal police, the judge made two legal findings about the definitions of “soldiers” and “quartering.” Referring to the claim as a “farfetched, metaphorical” application, the court said that “[t]here is no
sense in which a single state trooper and several deputy sheriffs can be
considered ‘soldiers’ . . . nor in which the use of a house . . . for a period
of fewer than 24 hours could be construed as ‘quartering.’” 59
The Mitchell court reached the same conclusion. As mentioned in
the Introduction, the Mitchell family filed a section 1983 60 suit against
their city’s municipal police claiming a Third Amendment violation.61
The police had removed the family members from their homes to gain
a “tactical advantage” over the family’s neighbor, whom the police were
investigating on a domestic violence call. 62 The officers ended up
forcibly removing both Anthony and Linda Mitchell from their homes,
and thereafter using their places to aid in their investigation.
The Mitchell court identified the rights protected by the Third
Amendment: “[U]nder Griswold, the Third Amendment protects private citizens from incursion by the military into their property interests,
and guarantees the military's subordinate role to civil authority.” 63 The
court held that a municipal police officer is not a “soldier” under the
Third Amendment. 64 The court stated this “squares with the purpose
of the Third Amendment because this was not a military intrusion into
a private home, and thus the intrusion is more effectively protected by
the Fourth Amendment.” 65 Given this preliminary conclusion, the court
never reached the question of what constitutes “quartering.” 66 The
court also did not address whether the incorporation question could
alter the inquiry. This is not particularly surprising, however, given
57.

No. 06-28-P-S, 2007 WL 1576744 (D. Me. May 30, 2007).

58.

Id. at *7.

59.

Id.

60.

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing civil remedies for constitutional
violations by governmental actors).

61.

Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154, 2015 WL 427835, at *5
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015).

62.

Id. at *1.

63.

Id. at *18.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. (“I need not reach the question of whether the occupation at issue in this
case constitutes quartering, though I suspect it would not.”).
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that the Mitchell family didn’t make any incorporation-based
argument. 67 Nor did the family attempt to argue the link between
“soldiers” and municipal police. 68
B. The Gap in Scholarly Commentary

Scholarly treatment of the Third Amendment, like treatment from
the judiciary, is wanting. 69 Much of the Third Amendment legal commentary has revolved around unique ways in which Third Amendment
violations may be currently taking place. Some have advanced
arguments characterizing federal government wiretapping as
“quartering.” 70 One scholar has urged that the Third Amendment is
violated in current schemes under which the federal government financially induces private universities to accept on-campus military
recruiting. 71 Another scholar has cautioned about the potential for
Third Amendment violations during domestic natural disasters, like

67.

Plaintiffs’ Combined Opposition to: (1) Defendants City of Henderson,
Nevada, Jutta Chambers, Garrett Poiner, Ronald Feola, Ramona Walls,
Angela Walter, Christopher Worley & Janette R. Reyes-Speer’s Motion to
Dismiss First Amended Complaint (CR17); and (2) Defendants City of
North Las Vegas, Joseph Chronister, Michael Waller, Drew Albers, David
Cawthorn, Eric Rockwell & Travis Snyder’s Joinder Thereto (CR23) at 57,
Mitchell v. City of Henderson, 2015 WL 427835 (D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015) (No.
2:13-cv-01154-APG-CWH).

68.

Id. at 55–58.

69.

One scholar recently endeavored to canvas all of the scholarly literature on
the Third Amendment in less than twenty pages. Scott D. Gerber, An
Unavoidably Brief Historiography of the Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L.
Rev. 627 (2015).

70.

See, e.g., Mike Gatto, Opinion, A Redcoat Solution to Government
Surveillance, L.A. Times (Sept. 29, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes
.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-gatto-surveillance-3rd-amendment-20150929story.html [https://perma.cc/J7WU-R8S5] (suggesting that the “federal
government’s military-run surveillance” may constitute a “modern form of
quartering troops in our homes”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Quartering
Spyware Troops in the Digital Age, USA Today (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:55 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/01/constitutional-lawthird-amendment-quartering-column/24220593/ [https://perma.cc/M3AFAD5R] (explaining that the Third Amendment extends beyond its literal
meaning of having troops move into one’s home); Josh Dugan, When Is a
Search Not a Search? When It’s a Quarter: The Third Amendment,
Originalism, and NSA Wiretapping, 97 Geo. L.J. 555 (2009) (arguing that
the Founders used the word “quartering” expansively to refer to substantial
governmental intrusions that threatened the rule of law).

71.

Geoffrey M. Wyatt, The Third Amendment in the Twenty-First Century:
Military Recruiting on Private Campuses, 40 New Eng. L. Rev. 113 (2005)
(challenging federal programs requiring universities to host military
recruiters in order to receive certain types of federal funding).
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Hurricane Katrina, where National Guardsmen might, out of necessity,
commandeer private establishments. 72
As of late, the Mitchell case has engendered renewed interest in the
Third Amendment. 73 Perhaps driven by the heightened scrutiny placed
on police departments within the last few years, some have been eager
to tie the Third Amendment’s prohibitions to police abuses through a
dynamic interpretation of “soldier.” 74 None of them, however,
sufficiently appreciate incorporation and the way it can expand the
inquiry. Similarly, while a team of scholars has recently written about
Third Amendment incorporation, 75 they did not consider it in light of
the police-as-soldiers question. These omissions are mistaken, for
incorporation serves as a mechanism by which the U.S. Supreme Court
could find that the Third Amendment restricts America’s state and
local law enforcement forces.

II. The Significance of the Incorporation Question
Should the Supreme Court consider whether “soldier,” as used in
the Third Amendment, encompasses municipal police, the Court would
have to undertake a two step analysis. That is, the Third Amendment
would have to be interpreted in two distinct historical contexts. At step
one, the Court would likely interpret the text of the Third Amendment,
as understood by the Framers of the Constitution. At step two, the
inquiry is significantly expanded. We consider whether the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Third Amendment
72.

James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic
Disasters, 17 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 747, 748–49 (2008).

73.

See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Real Live Third Amendment Case, Volokh
Conspiracy (July 4, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/07/04/areal-live-third-amendment-case/ [https://perma.cc/G7L6-M6MK] (discussing
recent Third Amendment litigation).

74.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley, The “War” Against Crime: Ferguson, Police
Militarization and the Third Amendment, 82 Tenn. L. Rev. 583 (2015)
(considering police as “soldiers” in the context of the Third-Amendment);
Sandra Eismann-Harpen, Note, Rambo Cop: Is He a Soldier Under the Third
Amendment, 41 N. Ky. L. Rev. 119 (2014) (suggesting that police may “fall
within the meaning of soldier under the Third Amendment”); Samantha A.
Lovin, Note, Everyone Forgets About the Third Amendment: Exploring the
Implications on Third Amendment Case Law of Extending Its Prohibitions
to Include Actions by State Police Officers, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
529 (2014) (discussing the protections available to the general public when
police officers “go beyond their constitutionally established boundaries”).

75.

E. Duncan Getchell, Jr., Matthew D. Fender & Michael H. Brady, Are the
Rights Guaranteed by the Third Amendment Sufficiently Deep Rooted and
Fundamental to Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth?, 82 Tenn L. Rev.
575 (2015) (examining the contemporary application of Third Amendment
jurisprudence).
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against state and local governments. This inquiry concerns whether the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the right in question as
fundamental.
In this Part, I will explain how the incorporation analysis can alter
the meaning of an unincorporated protection within the Bill of Rights.
Then I will illustrate my point by recounting how incorporation
significantly expanded application, and perhaps the meaning, of the
Second Amendment.
A. Incorporation and the Bill of Rights

Two features of incorporation provide potential avenues for expanding the Third Amendment’s protections. First, incorporation expands the universe of subjects bound by the prohibitions contained in
the Bill of Rights, namely state and local governmental actors. While
intuitive, this feature cannot be overstated. After all, incorporation
made the First Amendment applicable to state and local governments 76
despite the Amendment’s explicit language (“Congress shall make no
law . . .”), 77 which would appear to preclude such application. Second,
courts ask whether a given right or protection in the Bill of Rights is
fundamental, and hence ought to apply to state and local governments.
That question is answered by looking to congressional attitudes at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification rather than at the
time of the Bill of Rights. 78
Thus, application of a Bill of Rights protection to state actors,
coupled with the distinct emphasis on 1868, can result in constitutional
protection that is different than the Framers intended. Crucially, the
incorporation question is likely to lend itself to more flexible interpretations than analysis of original intent would. The most recently
incorporated amendment of the Bill of Rights—the Second
Amendment—provides an illustration of the potential that the incorporation doctrine holds.

76.

See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (finding a municipal
ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment).

77.

U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).

78.

See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and
Reconstruction 223 (1998) (“Mechanical incorporation . . . made it easy
to forget that when we ‘apply’ the Bill of Rights against the states today,
we must first and foremost reflect on the meaning and the spirit of the
amendment of 1866, not the Bill of 1789.”).
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B. Incorporation and the Second Amendment

Heller is a crucial consideration to the present Third Amendment
inquiry, as it showcases how the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court
interprets an amendment of the Bill of Rights (step one). McDonald is
even more significant, for it illustrates how the incorporation question
(step two) calls for analysis distinct and separate from that of step one.
Together, they expose how the Court crafted a new interpretation of
an arguably antiquated right—the Second Amendment—and divorced
the protection from its original militia-related purpose.
1. Heller and Step One

Prior to Heller, the Second Amendment 79 was scrutinized by the
U.S. Supreme Court only a handful of times. 80 In those cases, the Court
reaffirmed time and again that the Second Amendment only guarantees
an individual a right to keep and bear firearms in connection with
service in the militia. 81 Given the Amendment’s uncontested militiarelated purpose, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Second
Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”82
In 2008, the Heller Court took many constitutional scholars 83 by
surprise when it recognized that the Second Amendment to the Constitution confers an individual right to bear arms for self-defensive

79.

The Second Amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II.

80.

See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (explaining
that the Second Amendment shall not be infringed by Congress); Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1886) (holding that state law prohibiting
citizens from drilling or parading with arms in cities and towns does not
infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms); United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that because a shotgun with a
barrel less than eighteen inches in length did not have a reasonable
relationship to the preservation of a well regulated militia, the Second
Amendment did not guarantee a right to keep and bear such a weapon).

81.

See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (stating that the Second Amendment guarantees
no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have “some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”); see
also Presser, 116 U.S. at 265 (stating that the Second Amendment “is a
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government,
and not upon that of the States”).

82.

Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.

83.

See, e.g., Nathan Kozuskanich, Originalism, History, and the Second
Amendment: What Did Bearing Arms Really Mean to the Founders?, 10 U.
Pa. J. Const. L. 413 (2008) (finding that historical evidence in the form of
various documents shows that Congress intended to employ the right to bear
arms in a military sense only); Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 291 (2000) (finding that
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purposes, unconnected to service in the militia. 84 Prior to that holding,
John Hart Ely observed that, because the Second Amendment’s prefatory clause contains an explicit purpose—that is, the end of a “well
regulated militia”—the Framers apparently sought to foreclose alternative interpretations. 85 Similarly, Akhil Amar wrote, “to see the
[Second] Amendment as primarily concerned with an individual right
to hunt, or protect one’s home, is like viewing the heart of the speech
and assembly clauses [of the First Amendment] as the right of persons
to meet to play bridge, or to have sex.” 86
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia made his case by looking to
the Amendment’s text, English history, legislative history, commentary
by scholars, and legislative treatment by individual states in the wake
of the Constitution’s ratification. 87 In doing so, Scalia distinguished
between reasons for codification on the one hand, and underlying
rationale behind the right on the other. Despite the Court’s 5–4 divide,
both dissenting opinions and the majority agreed that the codification
of the Amendment was about preventing the federal government from
disarming state militias. 88 Where the majority and dissenting opinions
disagreed is on whether self-defense is “the central component of the
right itself.” 89 Given this distinction, Justice Scalia framed the right by

an interpretation of the Second Amendment’s doctrine, text, original understanding, structural inference, post-adoption history, and normative considerations all suggest that the Second Amendment is not to be expanded to
an individual’s right to bear arms in a non-military sense); David Yassky,
The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99
Mich. L. Rev. 588 (2000) (finding that the revisionist view of the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms for an individual purpose departs from the
Founders’ original intent).
84.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).

85.

John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 95 (1980).

86.

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131,
1164 (1991).

87.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–603.

88.

See id. at 599 (“[T]he threat that the new Federal Government would destroy
the citizens’ militia by taking away their arms was the reason that right—
unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution.”);
id. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[The Second Amendment] was a
response to concerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution that
the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national
standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the several
States.”).

89.

Id. at 599; see also id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Second
Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related interests. These
two interests are sometimes intertwined . . . But self-defense alone, detached
from any militia-related objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.”).
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emphasizing the broader concept of self-defense, thus dispensing with
the need to be restrained by the Amendment’s militia-centered intent.
2. McDonald and Step Two

Two years after Heller, the Supreme Court considered whether the
Second Amendment was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment and, if so, what the content and scope of the right is, as
applied to the states and municipalities. 90 The magnitude of this inquiry
cannot be overstated. Once the Heller Court declared that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right from federal interference, the
incorporation question left open a range of possibilities for what the
right might look like, as applied to municipalities and other
subdivisions. First, however, it is important to consider the doctrinal
boundaries of incorporation, as discussed in McDonald.
The McDonald majority affirmed the Court’s central holding in the
Slaughter-House Cases. 91 Namely, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, and not the Privileges or Immunities Clause, is the
vehicle through which incorporation operates. 92 The majority noted
that, while Justice Hugo Black’s theory of “total incorporation” 93 was
never adopted, the Court has nonetheless moved in that direction
through “selective incorporation.” 94 That is, the Court doesn’t merely
assume that each protection within the Bill of Rights applies against
the states. Rather, each unincorporated provision will require its own
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Analysis. 95
Second, the Court affirmed that it would continue to abandon a
“two-track” approach under which “the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.” 96 Rather, the rights contained
in the Bill of Rights apply to the states “according to the same
90.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

91.

Id. at 758 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not protect rights given by individual states—only
those provided by the federal government).

92.

Id.; All of the Justices agree on this point, with the exception of Justice
Thomas. See id. at 811 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that the Second
Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause and not the “legal fiction” of
the Court’s Substantive Due Process analysis).

93.

See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., concurring) (“I
would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment—to extend to all the people of this nation the complete
protection of the Bill of Rights.”).

94.

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763.

95.

Id. at 763–65.

96.

Id. at 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
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standards that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment.” 97 Similarly, the Court rejected treating the Second Amendment
and, presumably other provisions in the Bill of Rights, as being intended only against the federal government. 98 Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, argued that certain amendments, due to their nature, should
not apply identically to the states, as they do to the federal government. 99 That is, some Bill of Rights amendments are federalism protections. Like the Tenth Amendment, 100 the Second Amendment “is
directed at preserving the autonomy of the sovereign States, and its
logic therefore resists incorporation by a federal court against the
states.” 101
Finally, the Court reiterated that the incorporation question proceeds by asking if the right in question is “fundamental to our scheme
of ordered liberty.” 102 Put another way, the Court asks whether the
right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”103
Simultaneously, however, the McDonald Court frames the same inquiry
as a question of whether “the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” 104
Given Heller, the Court frames the “central component” of the
Second Amendment as the right to “individual self-defense.” 105 The
Court sought this route over a more specific framing (for example,
asking whether the right to own a firearm in one’s home was fundamental). This allowed the Court considerable leeway in expanding the
right protected by the Second Amendment. In fact, the Court explicitly

97.

Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10.

98.

McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764 (“The Court also shed any reluctance to hold
that rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under the Due Process Clause.”).

99.

Id. at 866–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Judge Easterbrook of the 7th Circuit
interpreted the Second Amendment this way. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am.
v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that state
prohibitions on firearms, even those implicating self-defense interests, are
not precluded by Heller).

100. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X.
101. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. at 764 (emphasis omitted).
103. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
104. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778.
105. Id. at 767.
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conceded that the original basis for adopting the Second Amendment
was no longer relevant. 106
The Court also reconfirmed that the historical analysis of events
leading up to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was necessary
to understanding the nature of the incorporated right. Specifically, the
Court looked at American values and practices from the Nation’s
founding through the Civil War, the legislative history pertaining to
the Fourteenth Amendment, and how individual states treated firearm
ownership. 107 Thus, as long as the individual right of gun ownership for
self-defense predominated in the minds of the Reconstruction Congress,
the specific worries of the founding fathers need not hinder the
Amendment’s reach.

III. The Third Amendment in 1789: Step One
In this Part, I will demonstrate how the Third Amendment, as
understood in 1789, was drafted deliberately with a limited scope. That
is, the Amendment was drafted in response to the ubiquitous presence
of the British army in the colonies, particularly in Boston, where this
brought about the Boston Tea Party and, ultimately, the American
Revolution. However, the language of the Amendment only captures a
small slice of those colonial grievances—the forced quartering of soldiers
during peacetime. Nonetheless, as Heller demonstrates, there is both a
reason behind codification, on the one hand, and a reason—or perhaps
reasons—behind the right itself, on the other. Thus, the Third
Amendment carries more meaning than its restrictive language suggests
at face value. Nonetheless, I will conclude this Part by illustrating the
inherent weakness in arguing that the Framers of the Constitution
would have interpreted “soldiers” to include municipal police.
A. Original Intent

The Third Amendment provides, “No soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner prescribed by law.” 108 The first clause
contains a prohibition on the quartering of soldiers during peacetime.
As with a handful of other amendments within the Bill of Rights, the
clause’s text provides for an absolute prohibition. The second clause

106. See id. at 770 (“By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the
inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the
National Government would disarm the universal militia—had largely faded
as a popular concern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued
for purposes of self-defense.”).
107. Id. at 770–77.
108. U.S. Const. amend. III.
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provides that quartering may be appropriate during wartime, providing
it is done so through formal, legal means.
Around the time of the Constitution’s ratification, the verb
“quarter” was understood to mean “to station or lodge soldiers” and
“to lodge; to fix in a temporary dwelling.” 109 Soldier was defined as “one
who performs military service for pay; a warrior; a common man in a
regiment.” 110 Thus, the Amendment, based on text alone, provides an
absolute protection for homeowners from forced lodging by military
personnel. So, what exactly drove the Framers to include the Third
Amendment?
The presence of a large, foreign military force, unanswerable to the
local colonists was central to the concerns of the founding fathers in the
lead-up to the Revolutionary War. The quartering of British soldiers in
Colonial America took root as a widespread phenomenon during the
French and Indian War. 111 The war had required a dramatic increase in
the number of British soldiers stationed in the colonies. 112 In response
to this influx, the British Parliament passed the first Quartering Act in
1765. 113 The Act provided that American colonists were required to bear
the financial burden of housing, supplying, and feeding British
soldiers. 114
The residual British soldiers that remained in the colonies during
peacetime, once the French and Indian War had subsided, caused tension between the soldiers and American colonists. 115 The tension became
particularly pronounced after 1768, when the British began using their
soldiers in the colonies for law enforcement. 116 This, in turn, led to
rebellion among the colonists and manifested itself in, among other
things, the Boston Tea Party. 117

109. 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (8th ed.
1799).
110. 1 John Ash, The New and Complete Dictionary of the English
Language (1775).
111. J. Alan Rogers, Colonial Opposition to the Quartering of Troops During
the French and Indian War, 34 Military Affairs 7, 7–8 (1970).
112. Id.
113. Quartering Act, 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 33 (Eng.).
114. Id.
115. B. Carmon Hardy, A Free People’s Intolerable Grievance: The Quartering
of Troops and the Third Amendment, 33 Va. Cavalcade 126, 130 (1984).
116. Id. at 132.
117. Seymour W. Wurfel, Quartering of Troops: The Unlitigated Third
Amendment, 21 Tenn. L. Rev. 723, 726 (1951).
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In response to the colonial unrest, the British Parliament passed a
new Quartering Act in 1774. 118 Known as one of the “Intolerable Acts,”
the Act further authorized quartering in private homes. 119 The First
Continental Congress shortly thereafter passed a resolution condemning
the legislation, declaring that, “the raising or keeping a standing army
within these Colonies in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of
the Provincial Legislatures, is illegal, pernicious, and dangerous; and
that every statute for quartering and supplying troops within the said
Colonies is illegal and void.” 120
Accordingly, the practice received special attention in the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration provides, in relevant part, “He
has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the
Consent of our legislatures. 121 He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil power . . . [f]or Quartering
large bodies of armed troops among us . . . .” 122
As this history suggests, the grievance that made its way into the
Third Amendment was the most specific formulation of a much broader
grievance. Nonetheless, it appears that there was no consideration over
whether to broaden the Amendment’s reach. For example, five of the
eight states that requested specific articles for consideration in the new
nation’s Constitution specifically called for prohibitions on the
quartering of soldiers. 123 Of the eight states that submitted proposed
quartering amendments, there were two general versions. 124 One,
exemplified by Maryland and New Hampshire, contained an absolute
prohibition on quartering of soldiers in times of peace, but was silent
on its application during wartime. 125 The other version, requested by
states including Virginia, New York, and North Carolina, included
language mirroring the Third Amendment. 126 That is, while forced
quartering was categorically prohibited during peace, allowances by law
would be permissible during times of war. Despite their differences, all
of these proposals provided absolute protection to homeowners from
forced lodging by military personnel.

118. Id. at 726; Quartering Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54 (Eng.).
119. William Sutton Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection
from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers, 124 Mil. L. Rev. 195, 201
(1989).
120. 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 69 (1774).
121. The Declaration of Independence para. 13 (U.S. 1776).
122. The Declaration of Independence paras. 13, 14 & 16 (U.S. 1776).
123. Hardy, supra note 115, at 134.
124. Bell, supra note 13, at 129–30.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 130.
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In summary, the Amendment was a reaction to the large presence
of British military troops across the American colonies. Thus, the
Amendment, as it emerged, only prohibited a narrow category of
abuse—forced occupation, by persons in the military, of a private
person’s house, during peacetime. As discussed, the Quartering Acts
authorized forced lodging in areas other than the home. Further, the
colonists frequently aired their quartering-related concerns alongside
their fears of standing armies. So, while the Amendment’s spirit targeted more general abuses by the British military, it was certainly
limited in scope. First, despite some initial disagreement among state
legislatures, the text explicitly prohibits quartering only during peace.
Second, the prohibition only applies to the home. Third, the restrictive
words in the Amendment seemingly preclude application to any type of
government actor. While limited in scope, that is not the end of the
discussion. Just as Heller distinguished between reasons for codification
versus rationale behind the right itself, there is a distinction to be
parsed here.
B. Reasons Behind the Right Itself

As discussed, the specific reason for codification was to protect
homeowners from forced lodging of members of a military unit. The
reasons behind the right, on the other hand, are multifaceted. John
Hart Ely, as an example, counted no less than three underlying values
behind the Third Amendment. According to Ely, the Amendment is a
“separation of powers provision,” a guarantee of “civilian control of the
military,” and a “desire to protect the privacy of the home from prying
government eyes.” 127 Similarly, Justice Joseph Story captured the
various facets of the Third Amendment when he wrote that “[t]his
provision speaks for itself. Its plain object is to secure the perfect
enjoyment of that great right of the common law, that a man’s house
shall be his own castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion.” 128 Justice Warren Burger also summarized the Amendment’s
spirit by writing, “the military must be subject to civilian control, and
that the government cannot intrude into private homes without good
reason.” 129
Of these underlying reasons behind the Third Amendment, two
deserve close attention—the imperative of civil domination over military affairs and the protection of the home from governmental intru-

127. Ely, supra note 85, at 95.
128. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 713, 747 (1833).
129. Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Burnham Holmes, The American
Heritage History of the Bill of Rights: The Third Amendment 6 (1991).
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sion. This framework renders the Third Amendment a natural fit between the Second and Fourth Amendments. The Third Amendment
flows from the Second, as both represent military-related prohibitions. 130 This is crucial, as the Framers of the Constitution saw an unchecked military as a direct corollary to the infringement of individual
rights. As Alexander Hamilton cautioned in The Federalist Papers, “[A
strong military leads to the] frequent infringements on [the people’s]
rights . . . and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery
not only as their protectors but as their superiors.” 131 Thus, the Second
and Third Amendments, read in concert, provide a constitutional check
against any usurpation of power by federal military units. Where the
Second Amendment solidifies the role of state militias by protecting
them against disarmament, the Third Amendment limits federal
members of the military from a specific tactic that was once
commonplace.
The Third Amendment can also be read in line with the Fourth
Amendment in that both seek to safeguard the home from governmental actors. 132 Both the Third and Fourth Amendments reflect the
longstanding common-law principle recognizing that “a man’s home is
his castle.” 133 As Blackstone wrote, “[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it
stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.” 134 Read in this light, both Amendments are homeowner-protection
provisions, standing guard against a range of potential governmental

130. See Amar, supra note 86, at 1174 (“Like the Second, the Third is centrally
focused on the structural issue of protecting civilian values against the threat
of an overbearing military.”); see also Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and
the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181, 185 (1962) (noting that the Second and
Third Amendments were passed as assurances to the people who were “still
troubled by the recollection of the conditions that prompted the charge of the
Declaration of Independence that the King had ‘effected to render the military
independent and superior to the civil power’”).
131. The Federalist No. 8, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (P.F. Collier & Son
rev. ed., 1901).
132. See Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the People: What the
Constitution Really Says About Your Rights 133 (1998) (“To be
sure, there is an important link between the Third Amendment and the
Fourth (which restricts searches and seizes)—both protect ‘houses’ from
needless and dangerous intrusions by government officials.”).
133. See Edwardo Coke, Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England 161 (London, E. & R. Brooke, 1797 ed.) (providing that, if
nowhere else, a man is safe in his house).
134. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223.
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abuses, including unreasonable searches and seizures and forced lodging
for members of military units. 135
In summary, the reason behind codification was to protect homeowners from forced lodging by “soldiers.” The reason behind the right
itself was the guarantee of civil control over the military and the protection of homeowners from governmental intrusion.
C. “Soldiers” and Law Enforcement

The crucial question here is, to whom did the Framers of the Bill
of Rights understand “soldier” to refer? There are a few narrow categories of persons whom the Framers of the Constitution understood as
embodying soldiers (defined as, “one who performs military service for
pay; a warrior; a common man in a regiment”). 136 First, the Framers
understood the British military as soldiers. After all, it was quartering
by the British that brought about the Third Amendment. While the
British soldiery would have no place in the new government of the
United States, it is useful to consider to whom the Framers were
reacting.
The Framers inherited from the British—and as a result of the
British—a grave fear of standing armies and concerns over military
involvement in domestic law enforcement. Two British statutes in 1714
confirm the distinction between the domestic law enforcement and
military law enforcement. The Riot Act provided for civilian officials
and the posse comitatus 137 (civilian-volunteers) to disperse mobs and
suppress civil disorders, and authorized those civilian personnel to use
any degree of force necessary to accomplish the purpose. 138 Distinctly,
another Act, passed within the same year, provided for use of the militia
in the event of “insurrection,” “rebellion,” or “invasion.” 139 This
bifurcation, however, didn’t stop the British from imposing military law
enforcement on their subjects outside of England proper.
135. See Morton J. Horwitz, Is the Third Amendment Obsolete?, 26 Val. U. L.
Rev. 209, 214 (1991) (speculating that, “if the Fourth Amendment had
never been enacted, the Third Amendment might have provided the raw
material for generating something like an anti-search and seizure principle”).
136. Ash, supra note 110.
137. See Posse Comitatus, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“[T]he
power or force of the country.”); see also Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the
Posse Comitatus Act, 21 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 383, 389 (2003) (“[Posse
comitatus] refers to the common law power of a county sheriff to summon a
‘posse’—consisting of any able-bodied person over the age of fifteen years—
to assist him in keeping the peace, pursuing and arresting felons, and
suppressing riots.”).
138. David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History
of Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (1971).
139. Id. at 17.
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The British enraged the pre-revolutionary colonists by providing
legal protection for their soldiers, who were “used with increase[d]
regularity for the suppression of tumults and civil disturbances.”140
Specifically, during British occupation of Boston from 1768 until 1770,
the British military began using their soldiers in the colonies for law
enforcement. 141 Its intention was to use its soldiery to enforce British
law in Boston and to seek civil obedience. 142 General Thomas Gage
confirmed British intentions when he suggested the occupation “will
strengthen the hands of government in the province of Massachusetts
Bay, enforce a due obedience to the laws, and protect and support the
civil magistrates and the officers of the Crown in the execution of their
duty.” 143
Notably, the way the Framers of the Constitution responded to
these events would sow the seeds for a century of federal and state
governments utilizing soldiers in a domestic law enforcement capacity. 144 That is, instead of proscribing military involvement in
domestic law enforcement outright, the Framers opted instead to vest
residual power in state militias.
D. The New Domestic Soldiery

The Framers would soon embed two general categories of soldiers—
the militia and the army—into the new Constitution. 145 The roles of
both of these types of soldiers were explicitly written to respect a
federalist balance. Thus, the Framers of the Constitution struck a
compromise by which the states would maintain militias, but the
Congress could call the militia forth, if necessary. 146 Here, the Framers

140. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 26.
141. Id.
142. John Phillip Reid, In a Constitutional Void, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 4 (1975)
(“The Earl of Hillsborough, secretary of state in charge of colonial affairs .
. . [told General Gage that the troops] ‘will strengthen the hands of
government in the province of Massachusetts Bay, enforce a due obedience to
the laws, and protect and support the civil magistrates and the officers of the
Crown in the execution of their duty.’”).
143. Id.
144. See infra Part IV.B.1.
145. Amar & Hirsch, supra note 132, at 129.
146. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . .
[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed
by Congress.” (emphasis added)).
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responded by seeking a constitutional framework that would emphasize
the use of state militias, rather than a federal standing army. 147
Notably, the enacted language would allow Congress to call forth
the militia not only to “suppress [i]nsurrections and repel [i]nvasions,”
but also to “execute the Laws of the Union.” 148 This controversial provision survived the passage of the Constitution to the dismay of many
Antifederalists. 149 Nonetheless, the Federalists sought to assuage concerns by assuring that the provision would only be used as a last resort.
Hamilton insisted that the provision would only be invoked “against
those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and
rebellions.” 150
In addition, many in the framing generation viewed, and argued for
the position that, the militia—being all “able bodied men” 151—was a
trustworthy source of power. Madison suggested state militias, given
their localized nature, would be structured as to avoid the potential for
tyranny inherent in a federal standing army. 152
E. The Limited Reach of Soldiers

Given these categories of soldiers, the Third Amendment, as originally understood, had a strikingly limited reach. First, federal soldiery
at the time of ratification was virtually nonexistent, as President
Washington had disbanded the Continental Army previously used to
147. See Articles of Confederation of 1777, art. VI (“[N]or shall any body
of forces be kept up, by any state, in time of peace, except such number only
as, in the judgement of the united states, in congress assembled, shall be
deemed requisite . . . but every state shall always keep up a well regulated
and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accounted.” (emphasis
added)); U.S. Const. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” (emphasis added)).
148. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
149. See Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates: Popular
Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 883,
890 (2006) (discussing the debate between Federalists and Antifederalists
concerning the role of the militia).
150. The Federalist No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
151. Militia, Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language
(1828) (defining “militia” as “able-bodied men organized into companies,
regiments, and brigades, with officers of all grades, and required by law to
attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to
pursue their usual occupations”).
152. See The Federalist No. 46 (James Madison) (“[T]he existence of
subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which
the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of
ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any
form can admit of.”).
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fight the British. 153 Second, state militias, logically, only counted as
federal governmental actors when called forth by Congress. Regardless
of its limited reach, however, the Third Amendment can be thought of
as written prospectively, as a preventive measure against potential
abuse of a regular army. 154
Either way, the Framers of the Constitution were aware of
“soldiers” performing law enforcement roles and were certainly fearful
of this becoming routine practice. However, the Constitution certainly
did not preclude such application. One could say that this line of
reasoning bolsters the argument that the Framers of the Constitution
would have seen municipal police as “soldiers.” I argue, however, that
this link is too attenuated because the Framers didn’t contemplate any
state and local governments being bound by the Bill of Rights. It is
important to bear in mind that the Bill of Rights, as originally penned,
was understood to only bind the federal government. 155 That is, the
Third Amendment, like all of the Bill of Rights Amendments, was a
vertical separation-of-powers provision. While James Madison initially
floated the idea of the Bill of Rights constraining both state and federal
governmental actors, the idea failed to garner support. 156 I argue that
certain historical developments after the Constitution’s ratification
make a better case for applying the Third Amendment’s protections to
state and local law enforcement. That is, incorporation analysis
provides the necessary hook.

IV. The Third Amendment Incorporated
In this Part I first argue that the literal Third Amendment passes
the McDonald test for incorporation. Then I show how alternative ways
of framing the fundamental right at issue—that is, the reason behind
the right itself—fare differently under the incorporation analysis. I
advocate the position that, in order to survive incorporation analysis,
the fundamental right behind the Third Amendment must be the
American tradition of protecting the home from governmental
153. David E. Engdahl, Foundations for Military Intervention in the United
States, 7 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 1, 26 (1983).
154. In 1792, shortly after the Bill of Rights was ratified, President Washington
signed into law a measure creating a 5,000-person regular army. Horwitz,
supra note 135, at 213.
155. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (“In almost every
convention by which the constitution was adopted, amendments to guard
against the abuse of power were recommended. These amendments
demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general
government—not against those of the local governments.”).
156. Brent Tarter, Virginians and the Bill of Rights, in The Bill of Rights:
A Lively Heritage 15 (Jon Kukla ed. 1987).
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intrusion. Framed properly, whether the Third Amendment restrains
municipal police will hinge on an interpretation of the word “soldier,”
the subject of the provision. 157 Regardless of how the Framers of the
Bill of Rights would have interpreted “soldier,” the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment certainly conceived of “soldiers” as encompassing those who perform domestic law enforcement functions. That is,
from the time immediately after the Constitution’s ratification, until
1878—a decade after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification—federal
and state governments progressively used the army, militia, and state
militias for domestic, non-war-related, interventions. In many cases,
militiamen were specifically used to supplement local police
departments. One scholar has aptly termed this phenomenon the
“police-ization” of the military. 158
Distinctly, another trend of the 1800s gives credence to the idea
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would consider today’s
police to be soldiers. The American police force of the 1800s looked
nothing like the police force of today in terms of their roles,
professionalism, and military characteristics. The phenomenon by
which “police agencies and police officers take on more and more
characteristics of an army” has been referred to as the “indirect militarization” of the police. 159 Because the indirect militarization of police
is a recent trend, it underscores the extent to which municipal police,
in the nineteenth century, were wholly different from those of today.
Based on these trends, I conclude the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers would have conceived that the Third Amendment protection, as
incorporated, has state and local police within its grasp.
A. Framing the Right at Issue

As discussed, the Third Amendment is loaded in terms of the fundamental rights it seeks to safeguard. The Third Amendment stands
both for the proposition that the military must be subordinate to civil
authority160 and that citizens must be protected, in their homes, from

157. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62
Stan. L. Rev. 1209, 1210 (2010) (arguing that a “bedrock question” of
judicial review is “almost universally overlooked.” That is “before judicial
review focuses on verbs, let alone objects, it should begin at the beginning,
with subjects . . . [e]very constitutional inquiry should begin with . . . the
who question: who has violated the Constitution?”) (italics in original).
158. See Charles J. Dunlap, The Police-Ization of the Military, 27 J. Pol. &
Mil. Soc. 217 (1999) (analyzing the growing use of the armed forces as
police officers).
159. Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of
America’s Police Forces 35 (2013).
160. See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 181,
186 (1962) (“[T]he axiom of subordination of the military to the civil . . . is so
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governmental intrusion. 161 However, only the latter justification—protection of privacy in the home—neatly survives incorporation analysis.
This is because a pattern of governmental activity, from Independence
to Reconstruction, directly conflicts with the civil-military relations
rationale.
From the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the lines between military and civil authority began to blur for almost a century.
That is, the federal government began a trend of using the federal army,
and state militias, for domestic law enforcement. This suggests that the
fundamental nature behind limiting military power, relative to that of
civilian authority, ceased to be of concern during the nineteenth
century. Some have attributed this trend—the growing acceptance of
standing armies—as the central reason for the Third Amendment’s
failure to garner broader application in the courts. 162 Others have
argued that this trend makes the Third Amendment a poor candidate
for incorporation. 163
In order to avoid this dilemma, it is crucial to frame the right independent of the civil-military relations rationale. Instead, it should be
framed in terms of the primacy of the home and fundamental right to
be free from governmental intrusion. This framing comports with the
Amendment’s intent, given that the language was a specific formulation
of an otherwise general grievance. That is, while the Framers
complained of ubiquitous British soldiers, 164 they would pen an
amendment—the Third—to address only the most objectionable aspect
of military power: the effect on the rights of homeowners. When framed
in terms of privacy rights in the home, the blurring of the lines between
civil and military law enforcement can be used as an advantage in
deeply rooted in our national experience that it must be regarded as an
essential constituent of the fabric of our political life.”).
161. See Story, supra note 128, at 747 (concluding that the Third
Amendment stands for the proposition that “a man’s house shall be his own
castle, privileged against all civil and military intrusion”).
162. See Horwitz, supra note 135, at 213 (concluding that, notwithstanding
President Jefferson’s reduction in the size of the regular army—from 5,000
to 3,300—“the legitimacy of a standing army came to be accepted,”
rendering it unable to “draw off the symbolic energy of those who might
otherwise have turned to the Third Amendment to support their fears of
the military or to insist that only a people’s militia comported with
Republican principles”).
163. See Amar, supra note 78, at 267 (arguing that two considerations of original
intent make the Third Amendment a “poor candidate for unrefined,
mechanical incorporation: 1860s Republicans did not share their small-rforbears’ disdain for central armies, and surely [the Reconstruction Congress]
did not mean to impose every aspect of federal separation of powers onto
states”).
164. See supra Part III.A.
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applying the Third Amendment’s protections against state and local
law enforcement.
B. The Third Amendment and Step Two

The right to be protected from forced quartering of members of a
military unit, given the sanctity of the home, is “fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty” 165 and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.” 166 This protection of the home against forced quartering
of soldiers has origins dating back to the Middle Ages. 167 In the modern
era, the first codification of such a right was expressed in 1628 in the
British Parliament’s Petition of Right. 168 The Parliament was
responding to concerns that “soldiers and mariners have been dispersed
into divers counties of the realm, and the inhabitants against their wills
have been compelled to receive them into their houses . . . against the
laws and customs of this realm and to the great grievance and vexation
of the people.” 169
Accordingly, protection from the forced quartering of troops also
made its way into the English Bill of Rights of 1689. 170 Shortly thereafter, however, the British Parliament reaffirmed, but limited, this
protection. 171 The Mutiny Act allowed local civilian magistrates to
direct soldiers to be stationed in “alehouses, inns, stables, and the
like.” 172 Significantly, the Act specified that private homes were offlimits from quartering in absence of the owner’s consent. 173 Also, the
Act did not apply to British soldiers stationed in the American Colonies. 174 As discussed previously, this spiraled into quartering during
and after the French and Indian War, and ultimately, the Intolerable
Acts, which led to the American Revolution. 175
Here I should note a potential stumbling block in the incorporation
analysis. That is, the United States government forced quartering of
federal soldiers in civilian homes during the War of 1812 and the Civil

165. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
167. Fields, supra note 119, at 196.
168. Hardy, supra note 115, at 128.
169. Id.
170. Fields, supra note 119, at 199.
171. Hardy, supra note 115, at 129.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See supra Part III.A.
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War. 176 Because these occupations took place in the context of war,
they were not absolutely proscribed by the Third Amendment. 177 In the
case of the War of 1812, Congress passed an Act to provide for
compensating homeowners for property damage related to quartering,
but only did so after the war. 178 During the Civil War, Congress passed
a law permitting the confiscation of Confederate property, but had no
similar provision allowing for quartering in Union-friendly homes.179
Congress contemplated creating a system for property-damage claims,
but ultimately declined to compensate those whose homes were
occupied. 180 Once the Civil War ended, the former Confederate states,
except for Tennessee, were divided into five military districts. 181 For the
most part, the federal soldiery was quartered in permanent or semipermanent military camps, tents or rented buildings, and forts. 182 Some
of the military districts implemented policies restricting quartering,
perhaps in acknowledgement of the undesirability of forced
quartering. 183
Thus, it is unclear how these abuses affect the analysis, or whether
this concern is offset by acknowledgement of those grievances by
Congress and individual Military Districts. Because most of these
abuses took place during war, it is unclear whether they meet the Third
Amendment’s “in a manner to be prescribed by law” test. 184 Even
assuming, arguendo, that these war-time abuses constituted Third
Amendment violations, that does not, in and of itself, compel the
conclusion that the Reconstruction Congress dispensed with the values
underlying the Third Amendment. 185
176. Bell, supra note 13, at 137–38.
177. See U.S. Const. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered
in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in
a manner to be prescribed by law.” (emphasis added)).
178. Bell, supra note 13, at 137 n.162.
179. James P. Rogers, Note, Third Amendment Protections in Domestic
Disasters, 17 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 747, 756 (2008).
180. Bell, supra note 13, at 138–39.
181. 1 Harry Willcox Pfanz, Soldiering in the South During the
Reconstruction Period 5 (1958).
182. Id. at 251.
183. For example, the Department of Georgia (Third Military District) required
approval from its headquarters, and the Department of Mississippi (Fourth
Military District) absolutely banned the practice in absence of the homeowner’s consent. See id. at 33.
184. U.S. Cont. amend. III.
185. For example, President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus via the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 755, didn’t preclude the Supreme
Court from affirming its fundamental nature. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83
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Nevertheless, these wrinkles are balanced out by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s legislative history. Leading proponents of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly argued that the Amendment’s effect would be to
incorporate the first eight amendments against the states. 186 The Third
Amendment received explicit attention during these debates. For
example, on May 23, 1866, Senator Jacob M. Howard said on the Senate
floor that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, “the right to
be exempt from the quartering of soldiers in a house without the consent
of the owner.” 187 Representative John Bingham, a principal Framer of
the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the Amendment would protect
the “inviolability of [individuals’] homes in time of peace, in that no
soldier should be quartered in any house without the consent of the
owner.” 188
Further, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification,
twenty-seven states—two-thirds of the states at the time—had explicit
prohibitions on the quartering of troops in their respective
Constitutions. 189 All of these provisions generally mirrored 190 the language of the Third Amendment. Even the Confederate Constitution,
although no longer valid after the Civil War, contained an explicit antiquartering provision. 191
Thus, the protection of homeowners against forced quartering is
deeply rooted in American history and was recognized as such by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. It should not, however, be thought
of, or framed, as strictly a military provision. Heller and McDonald
made clear that an amendment codified as a military-related provision
doesn’t preclude it from being read in a different light. In that case, the
Court effectively dispensed with the prefatory clause (“A well regulated
U.S. 36, 114 (1873) (finding that habeas corpus is a fundamental right and is
among the “privileges and immunities [that] attach as well to citizenship of
the United States as to citizenship of the States”).
186. It should be noted, however, that these arguments proceeded under the
assumption that the privileges or immunities clause was the vehicle for
incorporation.
187. Chester James Antieau, The Intended Significance of the
Fourteenth Amendment 118 (1997).
188. Id.
189. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868:
What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87
Tex. L. Rev. 7, 56 (2008).
190. Id.; see, e.g., Oh. Const. art. I, § 13 (1851) (“No soldier shall, in time of
peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; nor, in
time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law.”).
191. Const. of the Confederate States of America art. I, § 9, cl. 14
(1861).
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militia . . . ”) in favor of a non-military-related interpretation. 192 Here,
the right against forced quartering, at its core, is about protecting the
home from governmental intrusion, regardless of the military-related
connotations of the words “soldier” and “quarter.”
1. Soldiers and Domestic Law Enforcement

As mentioned, the Constitution’s Framers were conscious of the
potential for the use of soldiers in domestic law enforcement. Regardless
of the Framers’ immediate intentions, from America’s independence
until the Reconstruction era, both federal and state governments used
militias for domestic law enforcement. This is not to suggest that the
military—whether the standing army or the militia—was routinely used
in “direct law enforcement,” as in arrest or search authority, although
that did happen as well. 193 But these “soldiers” were mobilized to
enforce domestic laws in situations, the gravity of which fell short of
war, invasion, insurrection, or other legitimate challenges to governing
authority and rule of law.
This began with the Militia Act of 1792, which required all free,
white men between eighteen and forty-five to be enlisted in a state
militia. 194 A new amendment also allowed the executive, rather than
Congress, to mobilize the militia if requested by state governors or
legislatures. 195 The legislation was understood as allowing the executive
to mobilize these forces not as soldiers, but as “civilians” or posse
comitatus, at least so far as the law was concerned. 196
The Act was first utilized in 1794 to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion, a series of riots and protests against the federal government’s
imposition of a tax on whiskey. 197 In addition to suppressing the rebellion, Alexander Hamilton instructed the militia to assist in civil law
enforcement functions. 198 These instructions included supporting “civil
officers in the means of executing the laws,” which may require taking

192. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
193. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Police-Ization of the Military, 27 J. Pol. &
Mil. Soc. 217, 226 (1999).
194. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271.
195. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. 264; Robert Reinders, Militia and
Public Order in Nineteenth-Century America, in 5 Crime and Justice in
American History Part II 608, 611 (Eric H. Monkkonen ed., 1992).
196. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 26.
197. Cornell, supra note 149, at 894–95.
198. See Robert W. Coakley, The Role of Federal Military Forces in
Domestic Disorders 54 (1988) (listing Alexander Hamilton’s military
instructions and objectives).
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prisoners and delivering them to civil magistrates and even “seizing the
stills of delinquent distillers.” 199
This trend would continue, unabated, for the next seventy years.200
One military historian estimated that federal officials deployed the
army “at least seventy-two times to help quell major disorders and
other challenges to civil authority.” 201 Federal troops were also used for
objectively non-combat related law enforcement. For example, the army
was mobilized to assist locals in enforcing a law barring certain private
contracts between Native Americans and U.S. citizens (1796) and to
evict squatters from public land (1807). 202 A subsequent 1807
amendment further expanded executive authority over use of these
soldiers, allowing their use for broader categories of law enforcement.203
In the lead up to the Civil War, federal officials also mobilized the
army to capture and return runaway slaves, pursuant to the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850. 204 Presidents Fillmore and Pierce both permitted
federal officials to summon state militias to enforce the Act. 205 One infamous and contentious case was that of Anthony Burns, a runaway
slave who sought refuge in Boston. 206 Burns was apprehended by an
“enormous cortège of Boston police, state militia, and United States
troops,” and was delivered back to “the custody of his master aboard a
ship bound for Virginia.” 207
Both administrations had justified the use of state militias in enforcing the Act by suggesting they were merely summoning the posse
comitatus—mere citizen-volunteers—rather than soldiers. 208 Known as
the Cushing Doctrine, 209 this dubious justification would serve as a
199. Id. at 54–55.
200. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 49–55.
201. Clayton D. Laurie, Filling the Breach: Military Aid to the Civil Power in the
Trans-Mississippi West, 25 W. Hist. Q. 149, 150 (1994).
202. Id. at 152.
203. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 48–49.
204. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462–63 (repealed 1864); Peter M. Sanchez,
The “Drug War”: The U.S. Military and National Security, 34 A.F. L. Rev.
109, 118 (1991); see also Dominic J. Campisi, The Civil Disturbance
Regulations, 50 Ind. L.J. 757, 768 (1975) (“That law had stated that it was
the duty of federal marshals to arrest and return all fugitives brought to
their attention, and reasserted the marshal’s power to summon the posse.”).
205. Laurie, supra note 201, at 153–54.
206. Thomas J. Brown, The Fugitive Slave Act in Emerson’s Boston, 25 L. &
Soc. Inquiry 669, 671–74 (2000).
207. Id.
208. Laurie, supra note 201, at 153–54.
209. Caleb Cushing was Attorney General in the Pierce Administration. Cushing
famously justified the use of state militias in enforcing the Fugitive Slave
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precedent that allowed the federal government, over the next several
years, to avoid the tough questions posed by the trend of military enforcement of domestic law.
In 1861, Congress again granted the executive further authority to
utilize the militia and armed forces and made doing so even easier.210
According to one scholar, the Civil War and Reconstruction period
“marked the apex of military law enforcement.” 211
Following the Civil War, southern former-Confederate states were
occupied militarily and split into five military districts. 212 Non-warrelated law enforcement was among the occupying army’s roles as the
soldiers assisted with “controlling the illegal production of liquor, suppressing labor disputes, and enforcing Reconstruction policies.” 213
Only after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment did the
Reconstruction Congress seek to reign in the use of the military for
domestic law enforcement purposes. In 1878, Congress passed the Posse
Comitatus Act, which prohibited the federal government from using
troops in a domestic law enforcement capacity, save for a few narrow
exceptions. 214 The Act was passed in direct response to “[s]outhern
anger over this use of federal soldiers to uphold the laws of carpetbagger
governments.” 215
The states, for their part, also utilized their militias for domestic,
non-combat law enforcement. The militias were seen as an “extension
of the police” and were called forth by state legislatures and governors
to calm civil riots. 216 One historian compiled a brief, non-exhaustive list
of examples of state governments calling forth their militias in their
domestic law enforcement capacities:
[I]n New Orleans in the 1850s militia patrolled the streets after
police were unable to prevent a wave of arson; they quelled an
Act by positing, “[t]he fact that they are organized as military bodies, under
the immediate command of their own officers, does not in any wise affect
their legal character. They are still the posse comitatus.” Engdahl, supra
note 138, at 50–51.
210. Engdahl, supra note 138, at 26.
211. Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for
Posse Comitatus, 12 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 99, 111 (2003).
212. Pfanz, supra note 181, at 5.
213. Sanchez, supra note 204, at 118.
214. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (2015)).
215. Roger Blake Hohnsbeen, Note, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus
Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 404, 406 (1986).
216. Reinders, supra note 195, at 616–17.
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anti-Spanish riot, were involved in mob actions during elections
in 1854 and 1858, and they were called out over a bogus Negro
insurrection . . . Militia were used in anti-bank riots in Baltimore
(1835), in a Portland, Maine, riot (1855), caused by a dealer
overcharging on alcoholic “medicines,” and in Philadelphia (1844)
to separate rival fire companies. In Vicksburg the militia were
used to destroy gambling dens . . . in Chicago to demolish houses
of prostitution, while in Memphis two volunteer companies were
called out to enforce collections of wharf fees. 217

It appears some state militias, too, viewed their own role as including domestic law enforcement. In 1854, a contemporary military
historian and former militiaman wrote, “the militia are, after all, however unpalatable the truth may be, neither more or less than an
Auxiliary Police Force, and for the last forty odd years that is the only
duty they have ever been called upon to perform.” 218 In 1864, the United
States Service Magazine opined about the New York State militia,
observing, “Although [New York is] possessed of an excellent police,
there are times of popular excitement when our metropolis must rely
upon the presence of an armed force for the preservation of public peace.
The organized militia are particularly adapted to this duty.” 219
2. The Police of the Nineteenth Century vs. Police of Today

If the militia and army were used so frequently in domestic law
enforcement, where were the police? First of all, from the nation’s
founding until 1868, police forces looked much different than they do
today. The first modern-style police force—the London Metropolitan
Police—took root in Great Britain in 1829 and would serve as the model
for American cities like New York, Boston, and Chicago. 220 As the first
“modern-style” police were established in the United States in New
York in 1845, officers were required to live in the wards in which they
worked. 221 Today, a vast majority of police officers don’t live in the
communities they serve. 222
217. Id.
218. J. Watts De Peyster, 2 The Eclaireur: A Military Journal 21
(Augustus T. Cowman ed., 1854–1855).
219. Reinders, supra note 195, at 616.
220. Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, in 5
Crime and Justice in American History Part II 438, 443 (Eric H.
Monkkonen ed., 1992).
221. Balko, supra note 159, at 30.
222. Nate Silver, Most Police Don’t Live in the Cities They Serve,
FiveThirtyEight (Aug. 20, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.fivethirtyeight
.com/datalab/most-police-dont-live-in-the-cities-they-serve/ [https://perma
.cc/2SUJ-9UMK].
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Second, as America’s professional police force emerged, one of the
prominent points of controversy was whether police should be required
to wear uniforms. Members of the public objected that the uniforms
were too militaristic in nature. 223 In 1854, the New-York Daily Times
covered a public meeting between police and the citizenry in which a
local attorney claimed the uniforms represented the “commencement of
the establishment in this City of a standing army.” 224 This was
problematic because Americans “from their infancy [were] taught to
rely upon the spontaneous action of the citizen soldiery—the
volunteers—when and where they were needed.” 225 Nonetheless, the
police departments of Philadelphia and Chicago slowly continued the
trend by requiring uniforms in 1860 and 1861, respectively. 226 However,
as of 1860, only six cities in the United States had uniformed police
departments. 227
Third, police originally had a significantly more limited scope. Early
police work, during the 1800s, was characterized less as enforcers of
criminal law, and more as social workers 228 or a “kind of catchall or
residual welfare agency.” 229 Accordingly, New York’s first professional
police force was originally unarmed. 230 It wasn’t until 1887 that the New
York Police Department first mandated that its officers carry
firearms. 231
Today, police officers are not only armed, but are supplied many of
their armaments from the Pentagon, as authorized by a 1994 law.232
223. Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris, The Role of Police in American
Society 38 (1999).
224. The Police Uniform: Indignation Meeting of Policemen in the Park, N.Y.
Daily Times, June 30, 1854, at 4, ProQuest Historical Newspapers,
The New York Times.
225. Id.
226. James F. Richardson, Urban Police in the United States 28
(1974).
227. Reinders, supra note 195, at 615.
228. See Roger Roots, Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 Seton Hall Const. L.J.
685, 695 (2001) (explaining that the civil duties of police sheriffs initially
dominated any criminal law enforcement responsibilities).
229. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American
History 151 (1993).
230. Balko, supra note 159, at 30.
231. Chris McNab, Deadly Force: Firearms and American Law
Enforcement 71 (2009).
232. Radley Balko, A Decade After 9/11, Police Departments Are Increasingly
Militarized, Huffington Post (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:12 AM), https://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/police-militarization-9-11-september-11_n
_955508.html [https://perma.cc/PB3L-FUVG].
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The War on Terror has only exacerbated this trend. According to a
study by the ACLU, the value in military equipment used by municipal
police departments from 2001 to 2013 increased from one million to
over four hundred million dollars. 233 Since 2006 alone, state and
municipal law enforcement have acquired “at least 435 armored vehicles, 533 military aircraft and 93,763 machine guns.” 234
This has coincided with the contemporary phenomenon of widespread reliance on police paramilitary units, like SWAT for example,
which represents a significant phase of militarization. 235 These police
paramilitary units are modeled after special operations groups like the
Navy Seals, and approximately half of the country’s units receive specialized training from current and former operatives of the Navy Seals
and Army Rangers. 236 “[O]nce reserved as the last option to defuse a
dangerous situation,” these units are now routinely called forth, by
state and local governments, to “enforce laws against consensual
crimes.” 237 Thus, it appears today’s police paramilitary units bear a
strong resemblance to the nineteenth century militia. A recent New
York Times exposé captures the similarities:
Police SWAT teams are now deployed tens of thousands of times
each year, increasingly for routine jobs. Masked, heavily armed
police officers in Louisiana raided a nightclub in 2006 as part of
a liquor inspection. In Florida in 2010, officers in SWAT gear and
with guns drawn carried out raids on barbershops that mostly led
only to charges of “barbering without a license.” 238

233. J. F., How America’s Police Became So Heavily Armed, The Economist
(May 18, 2015), https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/
2015/05/economist-explains-22 [https://perma.cc/L9H7-26XX].
234. Jon Swaine & Amanda Holpuch, Ferguson Police, A Stark Illustration of
Newly Militarised Law Enforcement, The Guardian (Aug. 14, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/ferguson-police-militaryrestraints-violence-weaponry-missouri [https://perma.cc/USK3-85A3].
235. See Peter B. Kraska, Militarizing Criminal Justice, 27 J. Pol. & Mil. Soc.
205, 211 (1999) (describing the evolution of SWAT and Special Response
Teams from a “periphery part” of police departments to full-scale military
special operations groups).
236. Id.
237. Radley Balko, How Did America’s Police Become a Military Force on the
Streets?, A.B.A. J. Blog (July 1, 2013, 10:10 AM), https://www
.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_americas_police_become_a_
military_force_on_the_streets [https://perma.cc/VN49-AFJH]. Balko lists
examples of such raids, including that of “neighborhood poker games, doctors’
ofﬁces, bars and restaurants, and head shops.” Id.
238. Matt Apuzzo, War Gear Flows to Police Departments, N.Y. Times (June 8,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/us/war-gear-flows-to-police-
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3. Soldiers, State Actors, and Quartering

These two considerations—the nineteenth century “police-ization”
of the military and the vastly different roles of police officers throughout
American history—suggest that the Third Amendment, as applied to
the states, ought to bind state actors beyond the National Guard.
Perhaps the Third Amendment should govern all state and local actors
the way the First Amendment does, notwithstanding explicit
constitutional language that, based on the text alone, only binds Congress. 239
At the very least, the Third Amendment ought to cover police
paramilitary organizations like SWAT. The similarities between SWAT
and state militias of the nineteenth century are striking, at least in
terms of function. The only principled distinction between the two is
federalism. That is, the familiar argument that the Third Amendment
is among those Bill of Rights provisions whose core is federal
restraint. 240 Nonetheless, McDonald, and the line of incorporation cases
preceding it, evinces a deliberate pattern by the Supreme Court of
incorporating all of the Bill of Rights Amendments against the states.241
After all, it seems an implicit basis behind the very idea of incorporation
is, if the right at issue were important enough to be included in the Bill
of Rights, it is presumptively fundamental. So, unless the Court
reverses course and finds the Third Amendment to be a mere federalism
provision, this argument must fail.
While most of the discussion thus far has focused on the word
“soldier,” the Third Amendment contains another word that is perhaps
even more limiting—quarter. While the fact pattern in Mitchell v. City
of Henderson seemingly lends itself to straightforward application of
the “quartering” question, the court never reached that inquiry after
departments.html [https://perma.cc/C2UA-PGKM]; see supra text accompanying note 217.
239. See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
240. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 866–67 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“Although the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
profoundly altered our legal order, it ‘did not unstitch the basic federalist
pattern woven into our constitutional fabric.’ . . . Nor, for that matter, did
it expressly alter the Bill of Rights. The Constitution still envisions a system
of divided sovereignty, still ‘establishes a federal republic where local
differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty’ in the vast run of cases,
still allocates a general ‘police power . . . to the States and the States alone.’”)
(internal quotations omitted).
241. Id. at 764 (“The Court also shed any reluctance to hold that rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights met the requirements for protection under
the Due Process Clause.”); see id. at 764 n.12 (citing numerous Bill of Rights
incorporation cases).
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finding that police are not “soldiers” under the Third Amendment.242
Normally, when police occupy a private citizen’s home without the
person’s consent, it takes place when the home, or someone or
something within the home, is the target of investigation. Under those
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment analysis is triggered. In
Mitchell, however, the police used the family’s home to aid in their
investigation of the Mitchell family’s neighbor. That the nine-hour
intrusion appears to be more akin to an occupation, rather than a search
or seizure, suggests that there is potential overlap between the Third
and Fourth Amendments, at least under that fact pattern. 243
The Fourth Amendment, too, has its limits in this domain. That
is, there are cases in which the Fourth Amendment fails to protect
individuals in their homes notwithstanding police officials doing things
that could reasonably fall within a definition of quartering. In Segura
v. United States, 244 law enforcement officers remained in a suspect’s
apartment for nineteen hours without a warrant and after the defendant
had been removed off-site. 245 The officer remained in the suspect’s place
from 11pm until 6pm the next day when a magistrate issued a search
warrant. 246 Referring to the event as an “occupation,” the court found
that the seizure of the apartment was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 247 Were the Third Amendment to apply to the police, the
Segura court would have had to grapple with the Amendment’s
absolute prohibition on quartering during peacetime, rather than the
“reasonableness” requirement in the Fourth Amendment.
Or consider a case in which a valid search warrant was authorized.
In Lykken v. Brady, 248 police obtained a search warrant to search the
plaintiff’s property related to a stale murder investigation from decades
earlier. 249 The search lasted four days, during which the plaintiff was
not allowed to re-enter the interior of her farm to feed her livestock,
care for her newborn kittens, or even to turn off the stove. 250 The search
242. Mitchell v. City of Henderson, No. 2:13-cv-01154, 2015 WL 427835, at *18
(D. Nev. Feb. 2, 2015).
243. To be sure, the Mitchell family’s section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim is
pending. This category of civil claims allows litigants to recover damages
from the city, or individual governmental actors, for constitutional
violations. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
244. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
245. Id. at 801.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 813.
248. 622 F.3d. 925 (8th Cir. 2010).
249. Id. at 928.
250. Id. at 930.
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turned up no evidence, and the district court conceded the methods
were unreasonable. 251 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
the search complied with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement, because “brief detention was not [an] unreasonable
intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights.” 252
While it is unclear how these cases could have been resolved on
Third Amendment grounds, they do illustrate the limitations of the
Fourth Amendment in the context of alleged police occupations.
Thus, future Third Amendment litigants, like the Mitchell family,
ought to persist in seeking a judicial determination that “soldier,” as
used in the Third Amendment, binds state and local law enforcement.
Once a court makes this finding, the task will be to determine where
the Third and Fourth Amendments overlap and whether that alters the
available remedies. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment, by its text, is
significantly more far-reaching than that of the Third. 253 Nonetheless,
the existence of occurences, like those detailed in Mitchell, Segura, and
Lykken, suggests potential overlap, even if only in unusual cases.
Further, a judicial determination that the Third Amendment binds
state and local law enforcement must be aimed at eventually bypassing
the governmental defense of qualified immunity. As discussed, the
Engblom court allowed a facially meritorious Third Amendment claim
to proceed to trial, only to later be dismissed because the law was not
“clearly established.” 254 This is why it is so critical for litigants to persist
in their efforts to allege Third Amendment violations in the concededly
rare circumstance of police occupations of civilian homes. That is to
say, future victims of such occupations should seek to get a fresh Third
Amendment interpretation clearly established.

251. Id.
252. Id. at 926.
253. For example, the Fourth Amendment does not specify a governmental actor
against whom the right applies. We only know that the right “shall not be
violated” by government actors. Thus, the right has been interpreted to not
only apply against police, but to apply to other state actors like public school
officials. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 359 (1985). The Third
Amendment, on the other hand, can only be violated by “soldiers.” Further,
the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable “searches and
seizures.” The elasticity of those terms has evolved over time to include not
only physical searches, but even to include analysis of urine samples. Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (finding that
the “collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy”
and constitutes “searches” under the Fourth Amendment). Also, the right
applies to “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” The Third, on the other
hand, only protects persons in their “houses.”
254. Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1983).
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Conclusion
In this Note, I examine a unique way of bypassing the limitations
inherent in the word “soldier,” as used in the Third Amendment. I
advocate for using the incorporation doctrine, which, by its nature, can
yield novel—and perhaps even manipulated—interpretations of
protections in the Bill of Rights. Given incorporation doctrine’s emphasis on American history in the lead-up to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, I argue that it is likely that the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment would have understood today’s municipal police, and particularly police paramilitary units, as falling within the
definition of “soldier.” This is because, during the course of the nineteenth century, the federal government, as well as state governments,
understood soldiers as fulfilling domestic law enforcement duties, just
as police do today. Just as the Second Amendment is now an individual
right unconnected to service in the militia, the Third Amendment could
be interpreted as conferring an individual right against all forms of
governmental intrusion in the home, independent of military-related
contexts.
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